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Why Judges Should Not Make Refugee Law:
Australia's Malaysia Solution and the Refugee
Convention
Anthony Pastore*

Abstract
In a 2011 decision, the High Court of Australia effectively incorporated an
internationaltreaty into a domestic statute. The case involved a refugee swap deal, called the
'Malaysia Solution," between Australia and Malaysia, which the Austraian government
hoped would deter asylum seekers from making the dangerous overseas voyage to Australia.
However, some of these asylum seekers argued that the Malaysia Solution violated the
MigrationAct, an Australian immigration statute. The plaintiff proposed an interpretaon
of the immigration statute that incorporatedelements of the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, most notably the princaile of "non-refoulement."A majority of the High Court of
Australia agreed, and the future of the Malaysia Solution is now in doubt. This Comment
aTgues that the Malaysia Solution does not necessariy violate the plain text of the Migration
Act. By referencing unincorporatedinternationallaw, the High Court of Australia decided the
degree to which internationalnorms affect domesic poliymaking. Particulary in the refugee
context, this judicial practice raises concerns about political accountability and democratic
legitimacy. But there is a ready answer to these concerns: the Australian Parliament could
revise the relevant provisions of the Migration Act to directly incorporate the Refugee
Convention's precepts. More broadly,judges faced with conflicing domestic and international
regimes should defer to the laws of the domestic polity and leave the work of incorporating
international refugee norms to the democraticaly accountable branch of government-the
legislature.

BA 2010, Cornell University; JD candidate 2013, The University of Chicago Law School.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 15, 2010, residents of Australia's Christmas Island awoke to
screams and pleas for help.' A rickety boat carrying foreign asylum seekers had
crashed along the island's shore.2 With rescue made difficult by rocky
topography, the incident eventually claimed as many as fifty lives, including
some children.3 The story was shocking and widely publicized, all the more
because the carnage was captured on video for the whole country to watch.' The
Christmas Island shipwreck instantly became a political fulcrum in Australia,
which for decades had wrestled with immigration policy.' Prime Minister Julia
1

See Christmas Island ShipTwreck Ills Aylum Seekers (BBC Dec 15, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11997231 (visited Mar 24, 2012).

2

Id.

3

See Shipwreck Death Toll Could Hit 50 (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Dec 20, 2010), online
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-12-20/shipwreck-death-toll-could-hit-50/2380460 (visited
Apr 20,2012).

4

See ChristmasIslandShipwreck KIlls Aylum Seekers (cited in note 1).

5

For a historically expansive view of immigration in Australia, see generally Gianni Zappala and
Stephen Castles, Citizenship and Immigration in Australia, 13 Georgetown Immig L J 273 (1999). For
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Gillard set about to "smash" the "people smugglers' business model."' Although
the legislation was intended to prevent another Christmas Island shipwreck,
Gillard's disdain for a "big Australia" filled with unwelcome immigrants helped
fuel the rush to reform.
The policy that emerged was known as the "Malaysia Solution," codified in
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Australia and Malaysia. 8 To
dissuade asylum seekers and their smugglers from setting sail for Australia,' the
Gillard government resolved to send illegal migrants away to Malaysia for
processing."o Migrants worthy of refugee status would still receive the
protections required by international law, but not necessarily in Australia." Over
four years, Australia would send up to eight hundred "boat people" to Malaysia,
and in exchange, Australia would accept from Malaysia four thousand refugees
who had been properly processed. 2 Australia would pay for the costs associated
with relocation." Deterrence would be achieved both by expelling the migrants
from Australia and by placing them in the "back of the queue" for processing

6

a history of Australia's more recent struggles with boat people and other presumptive refugees,
see Catherine Skulan, Australia'sMandatoy Detention of "UnauthoriZed"Asylum Seekers: Histoy, Politics
andAnaysis under InternationalLaw, 21 Georgetown Immig L J 61, 65-93 (2006).
See Chantal Abitbol, Australia Grapples with Poliy on Asylum Seekers (CNN Sept 1, 2011), online at
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-01/world/australia.asylum.policy_1_immigration-minister-chrisbowen-boat-people-christmas-island?_s=PM:WORLD (visited Mar 24, 2012). Populist fear about
people smuggling, although a powerful tool for politicians, is not altogether irrational. See
Jacqueline Marie Hall, Note, Sink or Swim: The Deadly Consequences of Peopk Smuggling, 12 Ind Intl &
Comp L Rev 365, 367-73 (2002).

7

See Gillard Shuts Door on 'Big Australa' (AustralianBroadcasting Corporation Aug 12, 2010), online
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-06-27/gillard-shuts-door-on-big-australia/884050 (visited
Apr 20, 2012).

8

See generally Arrangement between the Government ofAustralia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer
and Resettlement (2011), online at http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/_pdf/
20110725-arrangement-malaysia-aust.pdf (visited Apr 20, 2012).

9

Christmas Island, due to its proximity to Asia, is a popular destination for such "boat people,"
some of who are originally from Middle Eastern countries and are fleeing violence. See Kevin
Drew, Refugee Boat Sinks Near Austraka (NY Times Dec 15, 2010), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/asia/16australia.html (visited Apr 20, 2012).

1o

See Austraa Migrants: Gillard to Pursue Malaysia Swap (BBC Sept 12, 2011), online
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14877524 (visited Apr 20, 2012).

"1

Id.

12

See Matt Siegel, Australian High Court Rules Out a Refugee Exchange Program, NY Times A9 (Sept 1,
2011). The term "boat people" appears to have its origin in the Vietnam War, when refugees fled
the country by boat. See Peter D. Fox, Comment, InternationalAylum and Boat People: The Tanpa
Afair andAustraka's 'Paafic Solution," 25 MdJ Intl L 356, 356 n 1 (2010), citing Hall, 12 Ind Intl &
Comp L Rev at 371 (cited in note 6).
Yow Hong Chieh, Malaysia Wiling to Swap Refugees aith Any Countrj, Says Hisham (Malaysian Insider
Jan 25, 2012), online at http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/malaysia-willingto-swap-refugees-with-any-country-says-hisham (visited Apr 20, 2012).

13
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once they arrived in Malaysia.14 The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (JNHCR) would-somewhat begrudgingly-oversee processing of
the migrants in Malaysia.'s Finally, Australia's Migration Act 1958 (Migration
Act) would give Australian officials the authority to transport migrants to
Malaysia." Or at least that is what the Gillard government believed.
In the recent case PlaintiffM70/2011 v Ministerfor Immigration and Citizensho
(M70), 7 the High Court of Australia obstructed the plan, concluding that the
Gillard government exceeded its power under the Migration Act.' On a
superficial level, the High Court of Australia held that Malaysia was improperly
designated a "safe" country, as the Migration Act defines the concept." But the
M70 decision was not merely an exercise in statutory interpretation. In the
majority opinion, the justices seemingly read the requirements of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)20 into the
relevant provisions of the Migration Act.2 This unexpected interpretive movethe judicial incorporation of international law into domestic refugee law-forms
the focus of this Comment. 22
14

See Bonnie Malkin, Australia's Malaysia Solution' Blocked by High Court (Telegraph Aug 31, 2011),

online
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/
8732810/Australias-Malaysia-Solution-blocked-by-High-Court.html (visited Apr 20, 2012). For a
more acerbic take on the punitive aspect of the arrangement, see Glenn McGowan, Malaysia
Solution

and

International

Law

(Online

Opinion

Sept

23,

2011),

online

at

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=12661 (visited Apr 20, 2012). "Queue
jumping" does seem to be a peculiarly Australian concern. See Skulan, 21 Georgetown Immig L J
at 82-84 (cited in note 5).

15

16
'7

18

19
20

21

22

See UNHCR Press Release, UNHCR Statement on the Austraia-MalaysiaArrangement (July 25, 2011),

online at http://www.unhcr.org/4e2d21cO9.html (visited Apr 20, 2012) ("UNHCR's preference
has always been an arrangement which would enable all asylum-seekers arriving by boat into
Australian territory to be processed in Australia.").
Migration Act (No 62), 1958 Australia Legislative Sessions 572.
[2011] HCA 32 (Austl).
Id at 148. Or, to use a somewhat coarse reference to the Christmas Island incident, the Malaysia
Solution is now shipwrecked. See Michael Gordon, The Malaysia Solution is Shipwrecked (The Age
Sept 1, 2011), online at http://www.theage.com.au/national/the-malaysia-solution-isshipwrecked-20110831-lmfm.html (visited Apr 20, 2012).
M70, [2011] HCA at
135-36.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), 189 UN Treaty Ser 150 (1954) (Refugee
Convention). Australia is a signatory to the Refugee Convention. UNHCR, States Partiesto the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol *1 (2011), online at
http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html (visited Apr 20, 2012).
See M70, [2011] HCA at IM90-119.
From a survey of media reports, it appears that the High Court decision was unexpected by
government officials. See High Court Dedsion Unexpected. Swan (Australian News Sept 1, 2011),
http://www.australianews.com.au/story?cityid=d1de82el -fce9-4f45-9541 at
online
79d83e888155&storyid
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Usually, the legislature is tasked with incorporating treaties into domestic
statutes.23 Yet here the relevant provisions of the Migration Act make no
mention of the Refugee Convention.24 Implicitly, therefore, the Australian
Parliament delegated to the judiciary the necessary work of incorporating this
treaty. As the M70 decision illustrates, however, this delegation creates
interpretive problems unique to judges. When international norms are at issue,
concerns about political accountability and democratic legitimacy collide with
concerns about transnational comity. How does a judge reconcile these
conflicting concerns? In M70, the High Court justices relied upon rigid
interpretive frameworks. A majority of justices believed that Australia's
compliance with international refugee norms was imperative.25 For that reason,
the majority understood the domestic Migration Act as a "reflex" of the
international Refugee Convention.26 On the other hand, a dissenting justice
believed that the majority's reading did violence to the domestic statute and that
the domestic statute is the only law of the land.2 7 According to this view, the
Refugee Convention is only marginally relevant because international norms
have less legitimacy than domestic statutes. 28 What is best for Australia takes a
back seat in this battle between interpretive ideologies. Australians should find
this troubling, as should advocates for refugee rights.
In Section II, this Comment surveys Australia's recent attempts to control
the influx of boat people. In Section III, this Comment demonstrates that the
recent decision, M70, went beyond the Migration Act's text to incorporate the
Refugee Convention's requirements into the domestic legal regime. In Section
IV, this Comment analyzes the unique interpretive problems that arise when
legislatures delegate the incorporation decision to the judiciary, using the M70
decision as a case study. Finally, in Section V, this Comment suggests that, both
in Australia and elsewhere, the judiciary should not be the branch of government
reconciling international norms and domestic refugee statutes. Instead,

25

=15ea44e2-b326-4a7d-8393-fl3d59bed791 (visited Apr 20, 2012). Much of the confusion
apparently flows from the discrepancy between Chief Justice French's rulings on similar issues.
See Ben Packham, Julia Gillard Attacks High Court's A.ylum Ruling (The Australian Sept 1, 2011),
online at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/labors-asylum-solutionall-at-sea-after-high-court-vetoes-malaysia-solution/story-fn9hmlgu-1226127340185 (visited Apr
20, 2012).
This principle is enunciated with regularity in US decisions. See, for example, Ganiav Texar, 131 S
Ct 2866 (2011) (dismissing habeas petition that cited Vienna Convention as legal authority).
Migration Act § 198A.
M70, [2011] HCA at T118.

26

Id.

27

Id at IM 153-54.

28

Id at1153.

23
24
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incorporation of international obligations is best left to the democratically
accountable branch of government-the legislature.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOAT PEOPLE IN AUSTRALIA
Australia has a long history of struggling with boat people, and the
Malaysia Solution is simply one recent chapter in a lengthy saga. The struggle
began with former Prime Minister John Howard's "Pacific Solution." 29 The
genesis of Howard's plan is reminiscent of the Christmas Island shipwreck. In
2001, a boat containing more than four hundred Afghan nationals foundered off
the coast of Indonesia." A Norwegian vessel, the MV Tampa, rescued the boat
people.3 The captain of the Tampa sailed for Christmas Island, which touched
off an embarrassing international tiff between Australia and Norway.3 2 No one
wanted the refugees, least of all the Australian government." After a successful
appeal through the Australian court system,34 government officials arranged for
the migrants to be processed on Nauru, a small island in Micronesia, and the
Howard government set about to legitimize its actions through legislation.3 5
Howard's plan involved designating certain Australian island territories as
outside the "migration zone," thereby restricting boat people's rights to claim
refugee status and make use of the appeals process." Then, all migrants were
diverted to these islands-or third countries like Nauru-and detained while

29

30

For an excellent survey of Howard's policies, see Michelle Foster and Jason Pobjoy, A Failed Case
ofLegal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Austraha's 'Excised' Tenitoy, 23 Intl J Refugee
L 583, 585-89 (2011).
See Ernst Willheim, MV Tampa: The Australian Response, 15 Intl J Refugee L 159, 159-63 (2003).

31

For a more personal rendering of the story, see generally Michelle Dimasi and Linda Briskman,
Let Them Land: ChristmasIslander Responses to Tampa, 23 J Refugee Studies 199 (2010).
See Willheim, 15 Intl J Refugee L at 159-63 (cited in note 30).

32

See id at 161-63.

33

Id.

34

The rapid court proceedings reveal the Australian government's sense of emergency as it
attempted to relocate the boat people. See Austraia Appeals Against Shtp Ruling (BBC Sept 12,
2001), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1536719.stm (visited Apr 20, 2012). At
first, Judge North obstructed the government's plan to remove the boat people from Australian
territorial waters. See Victorian Coundlfor Citil Liberties Inc v Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs, 110 FCR 452 (2001) (Austl). However, on September 11, 2001, the Full Court set aside
Judge North's orders, clearing the way for the government to relocate the migrants. See Ruddock v
Vadarlis, 110 FCR 491 (2001) (Austl).

3s

See Willheim, 15 Intl J Refugee L at 162 (cited in note 30).
See Fox, 25 Md J Intl L at 367-72 (cited in note 12). For a more human take on the Pacific
Solution, see Jane Perlez, Deep Fears Behind Austraa's Immgration Poicy, NY Times A3 (May 8,
2002).

36
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their refugee status was determined.37 This policy became unpopular," and
rioting broke out in the detention centers, where migrants could be held
indefinitely.39 The Pacific Solution was altered and finally scrapped in 2007.' But
remnants of the Pacific Solution have influenced current policies.41 The Malaysia
Solution, then, is merely an evolved method of tackling an old problem in
Australia.
The Malaysia Solution sparked a lively debate within Australia, and public
opinion on the swap deal was mixed.42 However, the M70 decision was widely
regarded as an embarrassment for the Gillard government, 43 which apparently
did not expect the ruling." Government officials rushed to denounce the
justices. 4 s The public was disappointed to learn that Australia was still obligated
to pay over large sums to Malaysia. 46 Now, the future of the Malaysia Solutionand boat people who land on Australia's shores-is in doubt.47
III. THE COMPETING LEGAL REGIMES
Although international law blocked the Malaysia Solution, the international
law in question, the Refugee Convention, does not explicitly appear in the

37
38

39

40
41

42

See Fox, 25 Md J Intl L at 367-72 (cited in note 12).
See, for example, Raymond Bonner, Pressed,Australian Leader Makes Changes in Handng of Refugees,
NY Times A7 (June 20, 2005).
See Rioting Aylum Seekers Set Fire to Detention Centers in Australia, NY Times A8 (Jan 1, 2003). The
rules regarding indefinite detention seem arbitrary and draconian. See Skulan, 21 Georgetown
Immig LJ at 84-86 (cited in note 5).
See Tim Johnston, Australia Ends Automatic Detention for Aglum Seekers, NY Times A8 (July 30,
2008).
See, for example, Norimitsu Onishi, Australia Puts Its Refugee Problem on a Remote Island,Behind Ra.Zor
Wire, NY Times A6 (Nov 5,2009).
For a flavor of the debate, see Susan Metcalfe, The Paific Solution Never Stopped the Boats. Malaysia
at
online
Sept
12,
2011),
Corporation
Broadcasting
Might
(Australian
http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/2880632.html (visited Apr 20, 2012); David Palmer, An Ethical
at
2011),
online
Street Aug
15,
Defense of the Malaysia Solution (Eureka
http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=27699 (visited Apr 20, 2012); Malaysia Soludon:
Pros and Cons (Eureka Street July 26, 2011), online at http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/
article.aspx?aeid=27391 (visited Apr 20, 2012).

43

See Phillip Hudson, High Court Decision on Malaysia Swap Deal an EmbarrassingBlow for PM (Herald
Sun Aug 31, 2011), online at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/opinion/high-court-decision-onmalaysia-swap-deal-an-embarrassing-blow-for-pm/story-e6frfhqf-1226126556331 (visited Apr 20,
2012).

44

See High Court Dedsion Unexpected (cited in note 22).

45
46

See Packham, Julia GillardAttacks High Court'sAylum Ruling (cited in note 22).
See Chieh, Malaysia Willing to Swap Refugees with Any Country (cited in note 13).

47

See Packham, Julia GillardAttacks High Court'sAlylum Ruling (cited in note 22).
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relevant provisions of the Migration Act.48 It is an "accepted general
proposition" that the Refugee Convention has no effect unless incorporated into
domestic Australian law.4 9 But then why is it "evident" to the M70 majority that
the relevant provisions of the Migration Act, which make no mention of the
Refugee Convention, are intended to conform to Refugee Convention
requirements?so This section will analyze the two legal regimes, the international
and the domestic; demonstrate that they are in conflict; and examine some
interpretive tools for reconciling the two. This analysis will lay the groundwork
to answer the question posed above.
A. The International Regime: The Refugee Convention
The language of the Refugee Convention is broad and can be interpreted in
many ways." Unlike a constitution, however, the Refugee Convention is not
interpreted by a single, hierarchal court system.5 2 There is no one supreme court
to promulgate binding precedent. Instead, there are many such courts;
interpretation of the treaty is left to the individual signatories. 53
The Malaysia Solution indirectly implicates Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention; the central tenet of Article 33 is "non-refoulement."5 4 From the
French refouler, non-refoulement is "[a] refugee's right not to be expelled from
one state to another."" The right is not confined to the Refugee Convention; it
appears in various forms in other treaties." Moreover, many commentators now
argue that non-refoulement is a matter of customary international law.

48
49

so
51

52

53
54
55
56

57

Migration Act § 198A.
See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v MinisterforImmigration and Muliculturaland IndigenousAfairs, 222
CLR 161, 174 (2005) (Austl), citing with approval Simsek v McPhee, 148 CLR 636, 641-43 (1982)
(Austl).
M70, [2011] HCA at1 98.
See Jeannie Rose C. Field, Bridging the Gap between Refugee Rights and ReaIty: A ProposalforDeveloping
InternationalDuiesin the Refugee Context, 22 IndJ Refugee L 512, 525-27 (2010).
However, the Refugee Convention does allow signatories to present disputes to the International
Court of Justice if other means of resolution have proven futile. See Refugee Convention, Art 38
(cited in note 20).
See UNHCR, Refugee Ptection: A Guide to International Refugee Law *6 (2001), online at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3cd6a8444.html (visited Apr 20, 2012).
Refugee Convention, Art 33 (cited in note 20).
Black's Law Dictionary 1157 (West 9th ed 2009).
See, for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 7, 999 UN Treaty Ser
171 (1966). See also Foster and Pobjoy, 23 Intl J Refugee L at 600-01 (cited in note 29).
See, for example, UNHCR, Note on InternationalPmtection, UN Doc A/AC.96/951 at 116 (2001).
See also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, To Transfer or Not to Transfer Identifying and Pmtecting Relevant
Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement, 80 Fordham L Rev 73, 84-85 (2011).
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Interpretation of the principle has become a cottage industry within legal
academia, and, understandably, there is some divergence of opinion on its
proper interpretation. Yet, this broad language must mean something. What do
the text and the purpose of the Refugee Convention have to say about the scope
of the right to non-refoulement?
In relevant part, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention reads: "No
Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion."" By its plain text, Article 33 does not
require signatories to accept refugees who arrive on their shores or borders;
signatories are only required to abstain from refoulement. Even commentators
who argue for a radical rethinking of the Refugee Convention concede that it
contains no such amnesty provision." This means that Article 33's plain text,
narrowly construed, has nothing to say about the Malaysia Solution, as long as
the migrants that Australia sends to Malaysia are not Malaysian refugees.
Therefore, the plain text leaves two important questions unanswered. First,
may signatories turn refugees over to non-signatories? If so, Article 33 risks
becoming irrelevant. Wily countries could create a proxy refoulement scheme
whereby a signatory palms off its refugees on a non-signatory, which then sends
the refugees back to their countries of origin. This is simply refoulement with an
intermediary. Resolving this issue is of particular significance to the Malaysia
Solution, since Australia is a Refugee Convention signatory and Malaysia is not."
The text of Article 33 does not seem to contemplate the possibility of proxy
refoulement, but this kind of scheme nevertheless seems antithetical to the
Refugee Convention.
Second, may a signatory send a migrant back to his home country before
determining whether he is a refugee or send a migrant to a country that has a
narrower understanding of the term "refugee"?" This question is relevant to the

s8

Refugee Convention, Art 33.1 (cited in note 20).

59 Lori A. Nessel, Extemated Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 625, 636

60
61

(2009) ("The Refugee Convention does not expressly provide for a right to enter a country in
order to seek refugee status.").
See UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention at *1, 3 (cited in note 20).
Two examples may illuminate this problem. Italy and Libya entered into an agreement whereby
the latter, a non-signatory, agreed to tighten its borders to prevent potential refugees from setting
sail for Italy; the agreement also facilitated repatriation of Libyan migrants who arrived on Italian
shores. William Wheeler and Ayman Oghanna, After liberation, Nowhere to Run, NY Times SR1
(Oct 30, 2011). In Sale v Haidan Centers Coundl, Inc, the US Supreme Court held that a domestic
statute whose language mirrored Article 33 did not prohibit interdiction of migrants on the high
seas. 509 US 155, 182 (1993). Repatriation and border tightening both seem to make a mockery of
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Malaysia Solution because the migrants that Australia intended to send to
Malaysia were unprocessed; their refugee status was yet to be determined.62
Malaysia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, and it has a rocky history
of respecting refugee rights." The obvious concern is that Malaysia will either
send the migrants to another state without determining their refugee status or
will rarely, if ever, permit the UNHCR to designate deserving migrants as
refugees.64 Even if Malaysia determines that a particular migrant is worthy of
protection, it is unclear whether that protection will be sufficient. 5 The text of
the Refugee Convention is silent on all of these issues.
Professor Michelle Foster proposes an interpretive framework that adheres
closely to the Refugee Convention's text, while employing a purposive reading to
fill in the treaty's textual gaps. Her framework, which builds on the Fourth
Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, provides a sensible
reading of the requirements of Article 33 and the Refugee Convention.6 Foster
first tackles the issue of proxy refoulement. She agrees that "the [text of the]
1951 Convention neither expressly authorizes nor prohibits reliance on
protection elsewhere policies." 8 To fill in this textual gap, Foster looks to a
relevant authority on the purpose of the Refugee Convention-the UNHCR.
The UNHCR interprets the Refugee Convention to require receiving countries,
like Malaysia, to establish refugee protections "akin" to those enumerated in the
treaty.70 The receiving country need not sign the Refugee Convention so long as
it generally follows its precepts." This interpretation means that the Malaysia
Solution is not automatically in contravention of the treaty because Malaysia is a

62

the non-refoulement rule while adhering to the letter of Article 33. For a broader application of
this Comment's thesis to other jurisdictions, see Section V.B.
See Section I.

63

See UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention at *3 (cited in note 20). On Malaysia's human
rights track record, see Bill Frelick and Brad Adams, Letter to UNHCR regarding the Refugee/Asylum
Seeker Exchange Agreement between Austraa and Malaysia (Human Rights Watch 2011), online at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/13/letter-unhcr-regarding-refugeeasylum-seeker-exchangeagreement-between-australia-and (visited Apr 20, 2012).

64

See Frelick and Adams, Letter to UNHCR (cited in note 63).

65

See id.

66

68

See generally Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Impications of Requiring Refugees to Seek
Protection in Another State, 28 Mich J Intl L 223 (2007).
For more information regarding the Fourth Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee
Law and the position of colloquium participants on protection elsewhere policies, see generally
James C. Hathaway, et al, The Michigan Guidelnes on Protection Elsewhere, 28 Mich J Intl L 207 (2007).
Foster, 28 Mich J Intl L at 237 (cited in note 66).

69

Id at 239-40.

70

Id.

71

Id.

67
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non-signatory. However, when considered in light of its purpose, the Refugee
Convention does not permit any kind of proxy refoulement scheme, and it must
be determined that Malaysia's refugee protections are sufficiently similar to those
enumerated in the treaty.72
Foster further argues that sending and receiving countries are jointly liable
for violations of the Refugee Convention pursuant to their bargain.73 This rule
partially responds to the concern that Malaysia might return a migrant to his
home country before assessing his refugee status. Although Malaysia is not a
Refugee Convention signatory, liability would inhere to Australia if Malaysia
violates the non-refoulement rule under the Malaysia Solution.
But what if Malaysia simply has a narrower understanding of the term
"refugee"? Does Australia violate Article 33 if Malaysia returns a migrant who
would have been considered a refugee under Australian law? Here Foster
responds in the affirmative. If a receiving country's understanding of an Article
33 "refugee" is substantially narrower than the sending country's understanding,
then the sending country may not relocate refugees to that country.74 Since
interpretation of the treaty is largely left to individual signatories, a country with
an expansive reading of the Refugee Convention should not be able to shirk its
duties by sending potential refugees to a country with a loose reading. Malaysia
is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, but Foster's rule may still be
applied in a modified form. For the Malaysia Solution to conform to Refugee
Convention requirements, Malaysia must not send migrants back to their
countries of origin when Australia would not understand the treaty as permitting
itself to do so.
Given that interpretation of the treaty is left to the individual signatories,
this delegation results in an entire constellation of potential legal rules that
implement the Refugee Convention's precepts. Analyzing the Malaysia Solution
under all these rules would be impracticable, but Foster's framework, as
modified here, is the narrowest reading of the treaty's requirements. As such, it
proves useful in examining Australia's domestic refugee statute.

J Intl

72

The Michigan Guidelines echo this view. See Hathaway, et al, 28 Mich
note 67).

73

Foster, 28 Mich J Intl L at 262 (cited in note 66) ("[Where two or more states enter into an
agreement to participate jointly in the processing of refugee claims, they are each responsible for
violations of Article 33 carried out pursuant to that agreement.").

74

Id at 248.

75
76

See id at 226.
See UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention at *3 (cited in note 20).

77

See UNHCR, Refugee Protection at *6 (cited in note 53).
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B. The Domestic Regime: The Migration Act
Australia's Migration Act formed the legal bedrock of the refugee swap
deal. The statute is byzantine and further complicated by amendments, but the
following overview provides a rough outline of the provisions relevant to the
Malaysia Solution. 8 First, Section 36 of the Migration Act authorizes the
issuance of "protection visas" to any "non-citizen in Australia to whom the
Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees
Convention."" Section 91R, recently enacted, provides some conditions on the
otherwise unqualified term "refugee.""0 These conditions ensure that the harm
from which a putative refugee is fleeing is substantial enough to warrant
Australia's protection." Read together, these two provisions clearly attempt to
satisfy Australia's Article 33 non-refoulement obligations.
However, these provisions were unavailable to the plaintiffs in the M70
decision. Christmas Island, the Australian territory where the plaintiffs first
landed from abroad, finds itself on nebulous legal ground. Section 5 designates
Christmas Island as an "excised offshore place," and Section 46A(1) designates
any illegal entrant as an "offshore entry person." 82 Together, these sections
essentially vitiate a migrant's attempt to file for a protection visa if that migrant
lands in one of these excised offshore places. Geography explains this
"excision": Christmas Island is located in the Indian Ocean, near Southeast
Asia.8 3 It is a natural port of call for boat people. Shutting off the conveyor belt
from Indonesia to Christmas Island is a natural first step in deterring unwanted
immigration. The excision also means that the protections afforded potential
refugees-those found in Section 36-are not applicable to the majority of boat
people. Since boat people who land in excised offshore places are not
automatically able to apply for a visa, they are deemed "unlawful non-citizens."84

78

For a breakdown of the Migration Act, see generally Andreas Schloenhardt, To Deter, Detain and

Deny: Protection of OnshoreAsylum Seekers inAustraha,14 Intl J Refugee L 302 (2002).

79

Migration Act §§ 36(1)-(2).

80

Id at § 91R.

81

See id at § 91R(2)(b).

82

Id at

83
8

§§ 5(1), 46A(1). Other "excised offshore place[s]" include the Ashmore and Cartier Islands
and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Id at § 5(1).
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Christmas Island (CIA 2012), online at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kt.html (visited Apr 20, 2012).
Migration Act § 14(1).
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It is then within the discretion of the Australian Minister for Immigration
(minister) to allow an individual migrant to seek a visa on a case-by-case basis."
What happens to these unlawful non-citizens who find themselves in
excised offshore places? The Migration Act is not an exemplar of clarity on that
point. Section 189 gives an officer the right to detain unlawful non-citizens in
excised offshore places." Section 198 commands that "[a]n officer must remove
as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen" who, in essence, has
not made a successful immigration application." Presumably the two sections
proceed in sequence.
Difficulties are compounded by Section 198A, which contains several
provisions relevant to the Malaysia Solution:
The Minister may:
(a) declare in writing that a specified country:
(i) provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for
assessing their need for protection; and
(ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination
of their refugee status; and
(iii) provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, pending
their voluntary repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in
another country; and
(iv) meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection; and
(b) in writing, revoke a declaration made under paragraph (a).88
This section seems to conflict directly with Section 198, which simply
commands the removal of unlawful non-citizens (presumably to their countries
of origin). The text also does not explicitly require that the minister's declaration
be made in good faith or with reference to particularized facts that support it.
With a declaration in force, an officer is then permitted under Section 198A(1)
to remove an unlawful non-citizen to the declared country.
To add a final layer of complexity, Section 198A(4) counsels that "[a]n
offshore entry person who is being dealt with under this section [198A] is taken
not to be in immigration detention."" This last ambiguity can be resolved with

85

Id at § 46A(2) ("If the Minister thinks that it is in the public interest to do so, the Minister may, by
written notice given to an offshore entry person, determine that subsection (1) does not apply to
an application by the person for a visa of a class specified in the determination.").

5 189(3).

86

Id at

87

Id at § 198(2).

88

Migration Act 5 198A(3).

89

Id at § 198A(1) ("An officer may take an offshore entry person from Australia to a country in
respect of which a declaration is in force under subsection (3).") (emphasis added).
Id at § 198A(4) (emphasis omitted).

90
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careful statutory interpretation. Recall that Section 198 mandates the removal of
unlawful non-citizens immediately and that this seems to conflict with Section
198A. Section 198 applies automatically if the non-citizen is a "detainee," which
elsewhere is defined as someone in immigration detention." Therefore, Section
198A(4) is a formalistic attempt to distinguish Section 198A from Section 198.
Those who fall within Section 198A are not "detainees" and, therefore, do not
simultaneously fall within the Section 198 framework.
The legislative history of Section 198A helps explain this structure. Section
198A was added as an amendment to the Migration Act in 2001, during
Howard's Pacific Solution era.92 Instead of the old system for deportation, which
relied on individualized assessment, the 198A framework allowed for mass
deportations after a country had been designated "safe."" As applied to the
Malaysia Solution, once Malaysia was designated safe by issuance of a Section
198A(3) declaration, essentially all unlawful non-citizens could be removed to
Malaysia rapidly and with little individual assessment.
Section 198A lacks any reference to the Refugee Convention. Elsewhere in
the Migration Act, specifically in Section 36, the Refugee Convention is
incorporated into the statute by reference. Protection visas are issued to
migrants deserving of refugee status as defined by the Refugee Convention.
However, this explicit mention of the Refugee Convention in one provision
highlights its absence in Section 198A. The significance of this point cannot be
understated, and it calls into doubt whether Section 198A conforms to Refugee
Convention requirements at all.
C. Interpretive Methods for Reconciling the Regimes
With two legal regimes, one vague and expansive and the other precise and
interstitial, how are judges to decide cases? Answering this question requires
developing an interpretive approach to deal with conflicts between the two
regimes."
91

Id at § 5(l).

92

See Angus Francis, Bringing Protection Home: Heatng the Schism between International Obkgations and
NationalSafeguards Created by ExtraterritorialProcessing, 20 Intl J Refugee L 273, 286-87 (2008).

93

See id.

§ 36(2)(a).

94

Migration Act

95

The MOU between Australia and Malaysia attempts, and fails, to span the domestic and
international divide. See generally Arrangement between the Government ofAustrafia and the Government of
Malaysia (cited in note 8). Although the MOU references non-refoulement and explains
processing protocol for migrants, ambiguous references to "dignity" and "human rights
standards" are little more than aspirational. More fundamentally, the MOU "is not legally binding
on the Participants" and therefore does little to advance our understanding of the legality of the
Malaysia Solution. Id.
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Broadly, there are two schools of thought on judicial reconciliation of
domestic and international regimes: monism and dualism.96 Monism, insofar as it
concerns competing legal rules, holds that an international legal rule should not
be subordinate to a domestic one.97 Both are coequal or on the same plane.
Legal norms culled from customary international law, for example, may supply
rules of decision in domestic constitutional cases. Unincorporated international
treaties are not to be treated with suspicion and disdain. Dualism, by contrast,
subordinates unincorporated international rules to domestic statutes and
common law.98 International and foreign rules may be persuasive evidence, but
domestic statutes and common law always control. In dualist thinking, common
law should be developed domestically, with little or no reference to international
practices or customs.99
Dyson Heydon, a justice of the High Court of Australia, may reasonably be
described as a dualist. In a law review article, he describes some modern judicial
trends to which he takes umbrage:
Judgments tend to cite all the efforts of their author, of their author's
colleagues, of ... English courts and American courts and Canadian courts
and anything else that comes to hand. Often no cases are followed, though
all are referred to. There is much talk of policy and interests and values. 00
A pessimistic take on modern judicial tendencies, Justice Heydon's description
does capture the dualist's understanding of the monistic approach: anything
goes. If foreign judgments and unincorporated treaties may supply rules of
decision, what is not fair game?

96

See generally Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend toward Interpreive Incorporationof
Human Rights Treaies, 107 Colum L Rev 628 (2007).

97

Id at 641. In its most basic formulation, monism is simply "a theory or doctrine of a single force,
source, or system from which all particular instances devolve." Oxford English Dictionary 1001
(Clarendon 2d ed 1989). In an abstracted form, monism can mean the subjugation of "all 'rights'
and 'goods' to a single determinative measure, conceived as a 'super' or prime value." Leon
Trakman, Pluralismin ContractLaw, 58 Buff L Rev 1031, 1032 (2010).
For a discussion of dualism, see Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage:
Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 BU Intl L J 197, 242-43 (2011) ("In
'dualist' systems, treaties are not directly applicable in domestic law.").

98

99

For an example of dualist thought in the American legislative branch, consider the Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, HR 1070, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 3, 2005), in 151 Cong Rec H 980
(Mar 3, 2005):
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of
the United States may not rely upon any constitution, law, administrative rule,
Executive order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any
foreign state or international organization or agency, other than English
constitutional and common law up to the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States.

100 Dyson Heydon, JudicialActivismand the Death ofthe Rule oflaw, 10 Otago L Rev 493, 501 (2004).
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A monist would respond that this critique is inaccurate. Michael Kirby, a
former justice of the High Court of Australia, describes the way he employed
international law in his opinions:
[C]ases arose for decision by me for which there was no constitutional
rule.... In such cases I began to reach for, and to find useful, the
developments of international law concerning human rights. . . . They

sometimes afforded practical help in resolving the controversy before me in
a normative way.101
For dualists, "normative" is a red flag, and dualists are not mollified by
Justice Kirby's promises of judicial restraint. Professor Melissa Waters offers a
narrower monist approach to the use of international legal rules in domestic
decisions, an approach that assesses international treaties on a case-by-case basis
and incorporates them into domestic law only after considering to "what extent
... the treaty [is] an authoritative expression of the views of the domestic
102

polity."
Judicial dualism has a longer history than monism, and dualism is deeply
rooted in the Anglo-American common law tradition where monism is a relative
0 ' However, the two schools of thought are not diametrically opposed.
novelty."
Monism simply expands the universe of legal material that may supply rules of
decision. Whereas dualism narrows that universe to domestic statutes and
common law, monism takes a broader view. However, monism still utilizes all
the tools of the dualist-domestic common law, domestic statutes, and domestic
scholarship. For that reason, a monist will seldom find distasteful a dualist
interpretation of the law, although the opposite is not necessarily true. 104
Therefore, to begin reconciling the Migration Act with the Refugee
Convention, Section III.D takes up the dualist mantle. Instead of incorporating
the treaty into Section 198A of the Migration Act, the following section will ask

101 Michael Kirby, InternadonalLaw-The Impact on NaionalConstituions,99 Am Socy Intl L Proc 1, 6
102

103
104

(2005).
Waters, 107 Colum L Rev at 701 (cited in note 96). There is the even narrower view, endorsed
recently by Elena Kagan in her confirmation hearing, that international law is merely a font of
"good ideas." See Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, S Hrg No 111-1044, 111th
Cong, 2d Sess, 126-27 (2010).
Waters, 107 Colum L Rev at 636-43 (cited in note 96).
Compare Michael Kirby, Constitudonal Law and InternationalLaw: Nadonal Exceptionasm and the
Democrade Defidt?, 98 Georgetown L J 433, 435 (2010) ("[In most countries, there is no particular
problem where a local statute expressly [or implicitly] imports into municipal law obligations
assumed by the nation-state under a treaty.") with Sosa v Alvare-Machain,542 US 692, 750 (2004)
(Scalia dissenting) ("For over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping this
lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of international law into American
law.").

630

T0Vol 13 No. 2

Pastore

Why judges ShouldNot Make Refugee Law

if Section 198A, standing alone, is compatible with the treaty. If the answer is
yes, then monists and dualists should agree with one another.
D. Is Section 198A Compatible with the Refugee Convention?
Analysis of Section 198A begins with the "declaration requirement," the
minister's obligation to make a formal announcement that the receiving country
is safe.' The first question is whether the receiving country must in fact be safe
or whether the minister simply must make a declaration to that effect. The plain
text provides no help. A declaration is "[a] formal statement, proclamation, or
announcement, esp[ecially] one embodied in an instrument."' 6 Without making
any reference to the Refugee Convention, it is at least plausible that a declaration
could satisfy the statute when the contents of the declaration are untrue.
Therefore, a dualist would not rule out any of the following assertions
about the "declaration" requirement: first, that the declaration need not be made
in good faith; second, that the statute does not require the underlying facts of
the declaration to be true; and third, that the declaration is only reviewable on
the "fact" that the declaration was made. The text of Section 198A does not
foreclose any of these possibilities. The Refugee Convention forecloses at least
the first two possibilities, since non-refoulement is an absolute right.'0 7 However,
the dualist is indifferent to the treaty's commands.
Ambiguity, however, does not end the analysis. A purposive dualist would
note that Section 198A was enacted to facilitate refugee relocations to Nauru
during the Pacific Solution years.' A textualist dualist would note that the
provision does not explicitly require good faith or factual validity. But a dualist
can only find the textual gap here and fill it in using some (domestic) interpretive
tool. Any dualist reading of the "declaration requirement," therefore, does not
tell us whether the Migration Act conforms to Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention; it only shows that it is plausible to read Section 198A as either
conforming to or not conforming to the treaty.
Unfortunately, when a dualist examines the factual criteria underlying the
declaration, Section 198A comes up wanting. Section 198A(3)(a)(i) requires a
receiving country provide "effective procedures for assessing their need for

105

Migration Act § 198A(3)(a).

106

Black's Law Didionay at 467 (cited in note 55).
Generally, it is understood that this rule excepts aliens designated unsafe. See Padmanabhan, 80
Fordham L Rev at 84-85 (2011) (cited in note 57). See also Refugee Convention, Art 32.1 (cited
in note 20) ("The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on
grounds of national security or public order.").

107

108

See M70, [2011] HCA at
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protection."' 9o In addition, Foster's narrow reading of the Refugee Convention
requires that the adjudicatory process in the receiving country reach substantially
the same results as if the process took place in the sending country."o Nothing
about the word "effective" indicates that the procedures in the receiving country
must result in the same outcomes. The term "effective" implies no concrete
level of stringency, and it does not imply that receiving countries must have
procedures commensurate with those of Australia. Here, there is simply no way
to bridge the divide between the domestic and international regimes, unless one
reads the international into the domestic, which a dualist will not do.
Might the minister's declaration that the receiving country "meets relevant
human rights standards" obviate the abovementioned concerns?"' After all, the
Refugee Convention is perhaps a relevant human rights standard in the refugee
removal context, and Article 33 of the Convention, although not mentioned in
Section 198A, is in fact referenced elsewhere in the Migration Act." 2 At first,
this approach seems like it could placate dualists and monists alike. A monist
might see this as carte blanche to incorporate the Refugee Convention, and a
dualist might begrudgingly agree, since the treaty has become part of the
domestic legislative history. But this approach may fail for two reasons. First, a
dualist might not require the Section 198A declaration to have any basis in fact.
Although the minister might declare Malaysia safe, for example, that need not be
true, or at least not according to the plain text of the statute. That would leave
the Migration Act wanting.
Second, the requirement that a country "meet[l relevant human rights
standards" only applies to "protections" for refugees and hopeful refugees. For
reasons that are unclear, the Australian legislature chose to cabin the restrictive
"relevant human rights standards" requirement to "protection.""' The
requirement that a country provide adequate protections commensurate with
human rights standards is only activated after a migrant has sought asylum, and
the human rights standards do not apply to the asylum-seeking process. Access
to this "process" need only be "effective." "Relevant human rights standards,"
in other words, provide no assistance to hopeful migrants who are proceeding
through the adjudicatory process toward a refugee status determination.
Therefore, a dualist will not be able to slip the Refugee Convention in through

109

Migration Act § 198A(3)(a)(i).

110

Foster, 28 MichJ Intl L at 248 (cited in note 66).

111

See Migration Act § 198A(3)(a)(iv).
See id at §§ 36(1)-(2). See also Section IILB.
The Migration Act requires a declaration stating that a country "meets relevant human rights
standards in providing thatprotection." Migration Act § 198A(3)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
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the backdoor, and as a result, Section 198A falls short of the Refugee
Convention's requirements.
Thus, even assuming away the potential problem with the declaration
requirement, the substantive criteria in Section 198A do not bring the Migration
Act within the penumbra of the Refugee Convention. This failure is not
unexpected, since the provision nowhere references Article 33. Dualist judges,
forced to consider the Migration Act and the Refugee Convention, will simply
say they are irreconcilable and hew to the domestic statute over the international
regime. With this interpretive groundwork laid, this Comment now turns to an
analysis of the recent M70 decision, where the conflict between dualism and
monism actually plays out between the justices.
IV. THE HIGH COURT'S DECISION
The M70 decision is factually sparse. Two unnamed plaintiffs, designated
M70 and M106, each arrived on Christmas Island in August 2011 after traveling
from Afghanistan.114 M106 was a minor at the time of the judgment."' The
record essentially leaves out all other facts, but in an interview, David Manne of
the Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre said this about the plaintiffs:
[Jhere's a very moving human story here and that is people who have fled
from very traumatic circumstances and have come here seeking our help in
a desperate bid for safety, are currently being incarcerated on Christmas
Island, wanting the Australian Government to look at why they're here and
to assess whether they're refugees.1' 6
Upon reaching Christmas Island, both plaintiffs were deemed "unlawful noncitizens," denied the right to apply for a protection visa, and prepared for
removal to Malaysia." 7 After Manne's organization was contacted,"' a team of
seven pro bono lawyers was assembled to litigate the case." 9 The legal team
quickly sought an injunction to delay the migrants' expulsion, which was granted

114

M70, [2011] HCA at

115

Id at % 5-8.

116

117

Tony Jones, Manne Discusses Rufing Against Malaysian Deal (Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Aug 31, 2011), online at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3307143.htm (visited
Apr 20, 2012).
M70, [20111 RCA at
5-8.

11

See Jones, Manne Discusses Ruing (cited in note 116).

119

See Chris Merritt, He's the Manne of the Moment (The Australian Aug 12, 2011), online at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/hes-the-manne-of-the-moment/story-e6frg6z61226113337580 (visited Apr 20, 2012).
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on August 7.120 On August 31, the High Court of Australia prohibited the

migrants' expulsion. 121
The M70 decision contains four separate opinions. The joint judgment is
the precedential opinion, and Justices Gummow, Hayne, Creenan, and Bell join
it. On the High Court of Australia, four justices constitute a majority. Chief
Justice French and Justice Kiefel filed separate concurrences, the latter justice
essentially agreeing with the joint judgment in every material way. Justice
Heydon supplied the lone dissent.
Each of the court's opinions addresses the same two issues relevant to this
discussion. First, concerning the Section 198A "declaration requirement," what
standard of judicial scrutiny is to be applied to the declaration in assessing that
declaration's validity? Second, applying that standard of judicial scrutiny, was the
minister's declaration effective? This Section will examine the justices' attemptor lack thereof-to bring the statute's requirements within the penumbra of the
Refugee Convention.
A. The Dualist: Justice Heydon
Justice Heydon is the lone dualist thinker on the High Court of Australia,
he is also the lone dissenter in the M70 case. In his opening paragraph, Heydon
makes clear the Refugee Convention should not supply the rule of decision:
'Whatever obligation Art[icle] 33 imposes on Australia, it is an obligation which
stems from a treaty. The treaty has no force in Australian law until it or any part
of it is enacted."12 2 Only summarily does Heydon genuflect to that treaty: "It is
true that legislation is to be construed so as to avoid, if possible, a breach of
Australia's international obligations." 23 But Heydon's "convention avoidance
doctrine," if it exists in practice, does not determine the outcome of Heydon's
opinion.'24
Next, Heydon considers the Section 198A declaration requirement, which
he construes narrowly.'2 5 The plaintiffs contend that the conditions that make up
the declaration must be factually true. 22 According to this argument, Malaysia

120

Judge

Delays First Refugee Transfer to Malaysia (The Australian Aug 7, 2011), online at
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/legal-challenge-to-australia-malaysia-refugeeswap/story-fn59niix-1226110402616 (visited Apr 20, 2012).

121 M70, [2011] HCA at

148.

122

Idat

150.

123

Id at

153.

124
125

See Heydon, 10 Otago L Rev 493 (cited in note 100).
See M70, [2011] HCA at % 155-59.

126

IdatT155.
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must be legally obligated to, for example, provide adequate adjudicatory
procedures. The courts, then, are to scrutinize the declaration for the existence
or nonexistence of these factual conditions, including adequate access to courts
codified by state law and fair judicial treatment without preference given to
citizens.
The minister, according to Justice Heydon, must ask a narrow set of
questions to satisfy judicial scrutiny.127 The minister must properly construe the
conditions of Section 198A(3), make an inquiry with reference to these
conditions, and then make a declaration accordingly.' 28 Heydon would reserve
the issue as to whether good faith or some limited basis in fact is required by the
statute. 1' Heydon does not believe the statute requires the searching inquiry
advanced by the plaintiffs.o
Analysis of two of the plaintiffs' contentions affords Heydon an
opportunity to spell out several rationales for judicial dualism. First, the plaintiffs
argue that the intent of the legislature was to operationalize the Refugee
Convention through Section 198A of the Migration Act."' Heydon responds
with an originalist argument. Section 198A was enacted to facilitate refugee
swaps with Nauru during Howard's Pacific Solution.'32 Nauru was not a Refugee
Convention signatory and did not have many of the domestic law protections
that the plaintiffs claim are required by the statute.133 Therefore, it is unlikely the
legislature intended to silently incorporate the Refugee Convention into Section
198A. Heydon grapples with the plaintiffs' first argument on its own terms, as
one might expect from a dualist confronted with a question of legislative
purpose.
Justice Heydon reserves his ire for the plaintiffs' second argument; their
brief argues that the term "protection" in the Migration Act should be
interpreted to accord with the definition of the term in the Refugee
Convention.134 To do so would be to import a wide range of humanitarian
127

Id at 1159.

128

Id at

129

M70, [2011] HCA at

130

Id at % 159-61.

131

Id at1166.

132

Id at1169.

133

See UNHCR, States Partiesto the 1951 Convention at *3 (cited in note 20). See also M70, [2011] HCA
at 1169.

134

Debbie Mortimer, et al, Plaintift? Outine of Submissions: Between PlaintiffM106of 2011 and Ministerfor
Immigration and CidZenship *8 (Aug 17, 2011), online at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/
m70-2011/M70-2011_Plf.pdf (visited Apr 20, 2012) ("Thus, the 'protection' of which subs[ection] 198A(3) speaks should be construed as the protection that the Refugees Convention
requires signatories to afford: namely, non-refoulement and the matters set out above.").
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protections from the treaty, and these protections are clearly not spelled out in
Section 198A. Justice Heydon strongly disagrees with this and explains his
unwillingness to use a treaty to supply meaning to ambiguous terms."as First,
although conceding some ambiguity in the language, Justice Heydon believes he
can resolve that ambiguity without turning to the Refugee Convention."'
Second, Section 198A mandates a ministerial decision and, as such, affords the
minister wide berth without much judicial second-guessing.137 Third, the
executive, of which the minister is a part, is a politically accountable branch of
government.' 8 The executive may be publically scrutinized or, if his decision is
particularly egregious, voted out of office. The judiciary is not politically
accountable in this way.
But all these rationales reduce to the simple fact that, for a dualist,
international obligations in unincorporated treaties are given the least weight.
Even vague concerns regarding agency discretion and political accountability are
enough, in Justice Heydon's view, to outweigh the countervailing concerns
regarding compliance with a major humanitarian instrument. Judicial restraint in
the area of foreign relations is something a dualist thinker can wrap his head
around. Compliance with an unincorporated international treaty is "talk of policy
and interests and values,""' so much so that Heydon grows suspicious of the
plaintiffs' entire theory of the case when he senses an attempt to conflate
international and domestic law.'40
B. The Fence Sitter: Justice French
Justice French's opinion is a compromise of the monist and dualist views.
On the declaration required by Section 198A, French takes a moderate position.
In making the declaration, French contends, the minister must satisfy two
conditions. The minister must "properly construe" the 198A criteria and then, in
good faith, assure himself that those criteria have been met.14' This is not as
nebulous as Justice Heydon's approach to the 198A declaration,142 and it is not
as onerous as the joint judgment's "jurisdictional fact" requirement.14 3 However,
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the standard is stringent enough that French believes the minister overstepped
his bounds. Accordingly, he concurs with the orders proposed by the joint
judgment, albeit for reasons that are meaningfully different.'" The most
significant difference between French's opinion and that of the joint judgment is
in the former's ambivalent-and ambiguous-treatment of international law.
Here, French is properly characterized as a fence sitter in the debate between
monism and dualism.
According to Justice French, for the minister to "properly construe" the
198A criteria and form a good-faith evaluative judgment, he must consider a
large amount of information about the receiving country.145 Some of this
information is expressly mentioned in the Section 198A criteria, some of this
information has no basis in the text or legislative history, and some of this
information concerns non-statutory international legal principles. French states:
"An affirmative answer to the questions posed by the criteria in s[ection]
198A(3)(a), reached by reference only to the specified country's laws and
international obligations, is not the end of the necessary ministerial inquiry."'"
The receiving country's history of adherence to these laws and obligations across
an indefinite swath of time also must inform the minister's decision. 471In sum,
then, he requires: (a) refugee protections codified in the receiving country's
domestic law, (b) refugee protections that comply with relevant international
obligations, and (c) a history of practical compliance with these laws and
international obligations.
This multi-factor inquiry opens a window through which the Refugee
Convention may enter the domestic legal regime without legislative
implementation. For Justice French, the non-refoulement obligation in Article
33 is "relevant," if not dispositive, to this case.14 8 The Section 198A(3) criteria
are "statutory criteria," he concedes, "albeit informed by the core obligation of
non-refoulement which is a key protection assumed by Australia under the
Refugee Convention." 49
Justice French only requires proper construction of the 198A(3) criteria
and a good faith evaluative judgment. He does not believe the High Court of
Australia should scrutinize the underlying factual validity of the minister's
declaration. His insistence, then, that the Refugee Convention is "relevant" is
really a wink and a nod to the minister. French would like to see the treaty play
144
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an important role in treatment of refugees, but he sees no way of shoehorning
the Refugee Convention's requirements-and strong judicial oversight-into the
198A(3) language. Instead, French leaves room for ministerial discretion and
urges the minister to use that discretion to incorporate Refugee Convention
precepts in his decisionmaking.
C. The Monists: The Joint Judgment
The majority opinion, or "joint judgment" in Australian parlance, is by far
the most monist of the opinions. After a recital of the relevant statutory
provisions, the joint judgment states the proposition that guides its hand:
The references in s[ection] 198A(3)(a)(i) to (iii) to a country that provides
access to certain procedures and provides protections of certain kinds must
be understood as referring to access and protections of the kinds that
Australia undertook to provide by signing the Refugees Convention and the
Refugees Protocol. In that sense the criteria stated in s[ection] 198A(3)(a)(i)
to (iii) are to be understood as a reflex of Australia's obligations. 150
There is an ideological gap between this statement and Justice Heydon's opinion.
Here, a treaty unincorporated into the 198A statutory framework is being
employed to interpret that framework. The reason is unclear, but the statute
apparently "must" be understood that way. To a dualist like Justice Heydon, this
is ijpse dixit plain and simple.
Monism explains the joint judgment's construction of the Section 198A
criteria. First, according to the joint judgment, compliance with these criteria in
the receiving country must not merely be observed in practice but "must be
provided as a matter of [that country's] legal obligation.""' For example, access
to Malaysian courts must be more than practicable for migrants; it must be
guaranteed by Malaysian law. To reach this conclusion, the joint judgment looks
to Section 198A(3)(a)(iii): the receiving country must "provide[] protection to
persons who are given refugee status."s 2 What are these protections? Employing
the "relevant human rights standards" language, the monist joint judgment fills
in this textual gap with the protections provided in the Refugee Convention." 3
These treaty protections include freedom from invidious discrimination,
freedom of religion, access to courts, freedom to work, access to education, and
freedom of movement.15" Since these treaty protections are best characterized as
legal rights, the reference to "protection" in 198A(3)(a)(iii) must also refer to
150
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legal rights. And since Section 198A(3)(a)(iii) must therefore refer to legal rights,
the other two Section 198A criteria must refer to legal rights as well. This line of
reasoning proceeds uninterrupted from a domestic statute to an unincorporated
international treaty and back again. The majority draws tenuous inferences from
the international treaty and applies them to interpret the domestic statute.
Second, monism explains the joint judgment's theory about the "access" to
"effective procedures" criteria. According to the majority, a receiving country
like Malaysia may satisfy the "access" to "effective procedures" requirement if it
codifies UNHCR oversight into domestic law.'"' As noted in Section III.D,
nothing in the text of Section 198A suggests that the receiving country's
adjudicatory procedures must comply with the Refugee Convention, but the
monist joint judgment seizes upon the ambiguity inherent in the word
"effective" to incorporate international law precepts.
Judicial monism further explains a paragraph in the joint judgment opinion
that a dualist would find bewildering. The government argued that Section 198A
was enacted in 2001 to facilitate refugee transfers to Nauru during the Pacific
Solution and that Nauru was not a treaty signatory.' 6 Presumably, this argument
attempts to decouple the Migration Act from the Refugee Convention, and
Justice Heydon agreed with the government. However, the joint judgment does
not accept this: "Mhose hopes or intentions do not bear upon the curial
determination of the question of construction of the legislative text."'s The
rejoinder to this claim is that hopes and intentions were what seemingly
permitted the majority to read the Refugee Convention into Section 198A in the
first place.' The opinion hides behind textualism. In reality, however, this
interpretive move cannot be explained by any traditional canon of statutory
construction. Rather, the majority is making a monist argument in the joint
judgment while attempting to wrap the result in the text of the statute: the
original intention animating the statute-or the statute's plain meaning-is less
compelling to the majority than the statute's compliance with the Refugee
Convention.
Monist thinking also explains how the joint judgment decides the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to apply to the minister's declaration.
According to the justices of the joint judgment, the minister's good faith is
necessary but not sufficient to uphold the declaration; the declaration must also
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be supported by "jurisdictional"-that is, objective-facts.' To require only
good faith "would.pay insufficient regard to [the statute's] text, context and
evident purpose. Text, context and purpose point to the need to identify the
relevant criteria with particularity.".o The text is inherently ambiguous, so the
"context and purpose" of the declaration requirement must be informing the
joint judgment's holding. Although it is not stated expressly, one gathers that the
"context and purpose" of the declaration requirement, as the joint judgment
understands it, is the Refugee Convention.
The joint judgment, unwilling to distinguish the domestic and international
regimes, must logically find the minister's declaration invalid. Because there is
inadequate refugee protection codified into domestic Malaysian law, Malaysia is
not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, and there is no binding agreement
between the two countries, the jurisdictional facts requisite for the minister to
make an adequate declaration did not, and cannot, exist. 6 '
For a dualist, the premise upon which the joint judgment relies to reach its
holding is both tenuous and impermissible. The monist premise is that
international obligations, whether or not incorporated by the legislature, are
legitimate sources of authority, useful for interpreting domestic law.16 2
Disagreement over this premise explains the divergent results that the monist
joint judgment and the dualist dissent reach on an otherwise simple matter of
statutory interpretation. The opposition of the joint judgment's and Justice
Heydon's results, at its core, is a disagreement over something more abstract
than what the Migration Act requires; it is a disagreement over the reach of
international law.
V. WHAT THE M70 DECISION SAYS ABOUT

INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
If there is a continuum spanning from monism, on one end, to dualism, on
the other, the joint judgment resides close to one end and Justice Heydon finds
himself close to the other. Justice French is somewhere in between. Monism and
dualism are not absolutes but rather matters of degree, and there is a great
heterogeneity of thought regarding the proper role of international law in
domestic contexts. For the Australian public, it matters greatly which judicial
interpretive framework holds sway on the High Court of Australia. Australian
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law-particularly, ambiguous law like Section 198A-is interpreted through the
justices' interpretive frameworks. The majority's framework, whether monist or
dualist, will necessarily influence the outcome of cases, as it did in M70. For
example, if the High Court of Australia were comprised of a few more dualists,
the Refugee Convention would likely be little more than a footnote in the
majority opinion with Plaintiff M70 and Plaintiff M106 on their way to Malaysia.
Legislatures, in theory, incorporate international agreements into domestic
law for the benefit of their constituencies.' Even a humanitarian agreement like
the Refugee Convention represents the public's political aspirations and
values.1 64 Incorporating the treaty into domestic statutory law formalizes these
aspirations and values. Judges, however, traditionally have a different role in
common law jurisdictions. Neither policymakers nor representatives, judges
interpret the law as it is written. Therefore, if legislatures delegate to the judiciary
the task of incorporating international law, the public good loses primacy.
Instead, resolution of cases like M70 depends upon an abstract debate about
judicial interpretation."' There is nothing assiduous about the judiciary's
different role in the legislative process, just as there is nothing assiduous about
the debate about proper judicial interpretation. But these different roles suggest
that a different branch of government-the legislature-is best suited to make
the appropriate call on the incorporation decision because the legislature is best
able to weigh the public interest on international matters like the one presented
in M70. '6 This section suggests how the legislature might make the
incorporation decision, both in the case of the Migration Act and in the case of
international refugee treaties more generally.
A. Revising the Migration Act
What would Section 198A look like if the legislature made the
incorporation decision? The best place to begin this inquiry is with a different
provision in the Migration Act. In Section 36 of the Migration Act, the
Australian legislature decided that the issuance of "protection visas" to "noncitizen[s] in Australia" would hinge upon whether "the Minister is satisfied
163
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Australia has protection obligations [to a migrant] under the Refugees
Convention."' 7 This reference provides a template for incorporation.
For Section 198A, the first step along the road to clarity might be an
explicit mention of the Refugee Convention. Instead of requiring that the
receiving country "meet[l relevant human rights standards in providing . . .
protection," the statute could require the country "meet relevant human rights
standards under the Refugee Convention." To avoid foreclosing deals like the
Malaysia Solution, the legislature could specify that the receiving country need
not be a Refugee Convention signatory to meet such standards. On the other
hand, if the legislature did disapprove of the Malaysia Solution, it could require
the receiving country to sign the treaty. To match the level of clarity achieved in
Sections 36 and 31R, the legislature could enumerate the considerations to be
taken into account when deciding whether a country is "Convention safe." The
most specific of all statutes might reference Foster's rule; namely, a receiving
country must reach substantially the same determinations on a migrant's refugee
status as would be reached in Australia.168
With these additional points of clarification, the differences between
judicial interpretive frameworks would be immaterial. The legislature would have
made the decision, and the judges would merely enforce the domestic regime, as
legislatively conflated with the international regime. Such a revision would
ensure that the Gillard government could expect no further surprises regarding
the legality of their future swap deals.
B. Revising Our Understanding of Incorporation
On matters of refugee law, the debate between monist and dualist judges is
not cabined to the Australian continent. In Baker v Canada,'6 ' the Supreme Court
of Canada decided a case factually similar to the M70 decision. Considering the
applicability of the unincorporated Convention on the Rights of the Child,' the
majority stated that "the values reflected in international human rights law may
help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial
167
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170
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review."". The dualist concurrence objected to the majority's permissive use of
international law:
I do not agree with the approach adopted by my colleague, wherein
reference is made to the underlying values of an unimplemented
international treaty in the course of the contextual approach to statutory
interpretation and administrative law, because such an approach is not in
accordance with the Court's jurisprudence concerning the status of
international law within the domestic legal system. 172
The Canadian legislature, like the Australian legislature, could smooth out the
ambiguities in its statutory scheme by updating domestic law.17 US decisions
similarly have referenced unincorporated treaties and international norms in the
immigration context, despite the US judiciary's definitive dualist stance. 17 4
The per curium opinion and corresponding dissent in HaiianRefugee Center,
Inc v Baker17 1 provides an interesting microcosm of the debate in US courts. The
case concerns interdiction of large numbers of Haitian refugees, who, after
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by military leaders, set sail for
the Southeastern US.17 ' The Coast Guard interdicted those boats and forcibly
returned the passengers to Haiti.'77 The plaintiff in the case was the Haitian
Refugee Center, which sought injunctive relief barring the Coast Guard from
continued repatriation.' The plaintiff argued that the Coast Guard had run
afoul of its Article 33 obligations by not assessing the refugee status of Haitian
boat people before repatriating them. In the abbreviated per curium opinion, the
majority argues that Article 33 is "not self-executing and thus provides no
enforceable rights to the Haitian plaintiffs in this case."'79 This treatment roughly
conforms to judicial practice in the US."
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The impassioned dissent argues for judicial incorporation of the Article 33
requirements: "Having promised the international community of nations that it
would not turn back refugees at the border, the government yet contends that it
may . . . actively prevent Haitian refugees from reaching the border. Such a

contention makes a sham of our international treaty obligations.""' Although
conceding that Article 33 was not given effect by congressional legislation, the
dissent argues "the subject matter, legislative history, and subsequent
construction of the Protocol support the proposition that the Protocol is selfexecuting and binding upon the United States." In essence, then, the dissent
argues that, despite no law enacting Article 33, the non-refoulement principle
should be applied to this case. This argument is just shy of monist thinking.
The HaitianRefugee Center and Baker cases demonstrate why an international
audience should understand the debate between monism and dualism in the
context of domestic immigration and refugee statutes. As this section argues,
incorporation of international treaties into these statutes is structurally better left
to the legislature than to the judiciary.
1. Political accountability and democratic legitimacy.
Where refugee statutes are at issue, legislative incorporation of
international law promotes political accountability and democratic legitimacy.
Professor Waters's moderate view of judicial monisml8 relies on a belief that the
trend toward judicial monism is "inevitable," but Waters admonishes judges and
scholars to address "with great care and sensitivity . . . democratic legitimacy

concerns."18 4 This statement implies that legislative lawmaking is superior to
judicial lawmaking from the perspective of legitimacy. Waters contends that
judicial incorporation is desirable when the treaty in question expresses the views
"of the domestic polity."' 8 But public opinion concerning the Malaysia Solution
was mixed.'86 Support for tough immigration policies has ebbed and flowed, as
highlighted by the history of such policies in Australia. Moreover, who becomes
a member of the Australian polity is an extremely weighty decision. The matter
should be decided by a deliberative body that can better debate the matter on
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behalf of the public; the government should not leave to the judiciary a question
so central to sovereignty as who may become a citizen.
2. Legislative clarity and agency costs.
Section 198A of the Migration Act is not an exemplar of clarity. What
What
constitutes "relevant human rights standards" is left unspecified.'
constitutes "effective" adjudicatory procedures also is left unspecified.8"' These
are important criteria, and there is no reason for the statute to be clear if the
legislature can count on the judiciary to fill in the gaps. Unclear statutes
implicitly delegate rulemaking authority to the judiciary, but the effects of
unintended delegation are especially undesirable in the refugee context. Treaties
like the Refugee Convention involve important substantive rights for individuals
in an especially vulnerable position. These treaties also affect the rights of
current citizens, who are being asked to welcome new citizens into the domestic
fold. Signing such treaties should be a weighty decision, just as mcorporating
those treaties into domestic law should be a weighty decision. Yet, those
important rights risk abridgement, and the incorporation decision becomes
unnecessary if the job is passed off to the judiciary. If undisciplined by the
judiciary, a legislature is free to make a hash of refugee law without making
tough decisions on behalf of its constituents.
3. Transparency and predictability.
Apparently, the decision in M70 was a surprise to the Gillard
government." That surprise demonstrates that Section 198A left open a wide
range of reasonable interpretations, widened further by the existence of the
Refugee Convention. This wide range afforded the justices the ability to decide
for themselves the extent to which treaties should be incorporated into refugee
laws. The decisionmaking took place outside of the public eye, in the opaque
confines of the High Court chambers. Generally, discretion increases
unpredictability, as the Gillard government's reaction demonstrates. Vague

187

In unfortunately populist terms, some American legislators have acknowledged the democratic
superiority of legislative incorporation. Consider this statement by Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions
at Elena Kagan's confirmation hearing:
I do not see how anyone can justify a citation to actions outside the country as
any authority whatsoever to define what Americans have done. Americans
believe that you only govern with the consent of the governed, and we have
not consented to be governed by Europe or any other advanced nation.
Nomination of Elena Kagan at 302 (cited in note 102).

188

Migration Act § 198A(3)(a)(iv).

189

Id at § 198A(3)(a)(i).

190

See note 22.

Winter 2013

645

ChicagoJournal of InternationalLan

statutes hurt vulnerable migrants who may not have access to sophisticated legal
counsel. Therefore, the greater the detail with which a statute incorporates or
rejects the Refugee Convention's requirements, the less discretion is given to the
judiciary and the more predictable and legitimate the judicial results will
necessarily be. The range of interpretive tools available to a judge is vast when
applying monist thinking to a domestic immigration problem. In order to limit
this otherwise broad discretion to a democratically agreed-upon legislative
solution, a legislature should incorporate international law-with care and
specificity-into the domestic statutory regime. In that way, the legislature can
reduce the unpredictability that necessarily results from punting the issue to the
judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nexus between the domestic and international regimes is riven by
judicial strife. Between monists and dualists, an interesting debate is unfolding in
decisions and scholarship concerning the proper role of international law in
domestic statutory interpretation and common law development. This debate is
an academic one, but for a polity's laws and norms-particularly its refugee
laws-it is a potentially dangerous one. Justice Scalia famously quipped about
judicial activists that "[flor over two decades now, unelected federal judges have
been usurping lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of
international law into American law."' 9' This Comment has had little to say
about judicial activism, for in the refugee law context, the problem is not that
judges are incorporating norms of international law into their immigration
decisions but that legislatures give judges the unfettered discretion to choose
whether and how much they incorporate.
Why legislators choose to delegate implicitly these weighty decisions is a
topic for other articles. Legislators frequently write unspecific statutes, and
scholars frequently speculate why.'92 This Comment does not add to that body
of scholarship. Nor is this Comment a paean to judicial isolationism or a plea
against judicial usurpation. Rather, this Comment suggests that, in the context of
refugee law, there is increasingly a suboptimal relationship between two
branches of government. One branch, the legislature, charged with deciding who
gets the benefits of refugee protection guaranteed by international law, fails to
write specific legislation making those difficult decisions. The other branch, the
judiciary, latches upon that ambiguity to do work the legislature failed to do.

191 Sosa, 542 US at 750 (Scalia dissenting).
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With substantive rights as important as non-refoulement at issue, this situation is
problematic.
Australia's Malaysia Solution-and the litigation that surrounded itprovides an interesting case study in the problem. Here, the opinions in the M70
decision fall neatly along a continuum, from monist to dualist, demonstrating the
heterogeneity of thought on the issue of judicial incorporation. The fact that this
debate holds the domestic law captive should strike Australians as undesirable.
For the Australian Parliament and the Gillard government, however, there
should be nothing surprising about the outcome of the case. Judges necessarily
decide cases through the lens of an interpretive framework, and different judges
will necessarily have different judicial frameworks. However, quibbles about
proper interpretive methods should not be dispositive when deciding issues as
weighty as those presented in this case. Instead, the democratically elected organ
of government should make the call and leave the academic debate to the judges.
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